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CRIMINAL LAW-MUSTLOVE DOGS: ZACH AND
KENJI'S ESCAPE FROM CONFINEMENT AND

THE BROADER CONTEXT OF ANIMAL
CRUELTY-COMMONWEALTH V TREFRY, 51
N.E.3D 502 (MASS. APP. CT. 2016)
The policy interest in protecting animals from cruelty is historically
evidenced by consistent expansion of criminal statutes created with the
goal of preventing animal abuse.'
Massachusetts has followed this
legislative trend by amending the scope of current laws to encapsulate
different types of conduct with animals as cruelty. 2 In Commonwealth v.

1 See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 272, § 77 (LexisNexis 2014) (defining conduct equating to

animal cruelty). Applicable portions of the acts outline the following:
[W]hoever overdrives, overloads, drives when overloaded, overworks, tortures,
torments, deprives of necessary sustenance, cruelly beats, mutilates or kills an animal,
or causes or procures an animal to be overdriven, overloaded, driven when overloaded,
overworked, tortured, tormented, deprived of necessary sustenance, cruelly beaten,
mutilated or killed; and whoever uses in a cruel or inhuman manner in a race, game, or
contest, or in training therefor, as lure or bait a live animal, except an animal if used as
lure or bait in fishing; and whoever, having the charge or custody of an animal, either
as owner or otherwise, inflicts unnecessary cruelty upon it, or unnecessarily fails to
provide it with proper food, drink, shelter, sanitary environment, or protection from the
weather, and whoever, as owner, possessor, or person having the charge or custody of
an animal, cruelly drives or works it when unfit for labor, or willfully abandons it, or
carries it or causes it to be carried in or upon a vehicle, or otherwise, in an
unnecessarily cruel or inhuman manner or in a way and manner which might endanger
the animal carried thereon, or knowingly and willfully authorizes or permits it to be
subjected to unnecessary torture, suffering or cruelty of any kind shall be
punished ....
Id. See also MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 140, § 174E (LexisNexis 2016) (describing restricted
methods of restraining dogs outside); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 140, § 152 (LexisNexis 2012)
(outlining animal control officers' duties toward individuals in violation of animal cruelty);
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 272, § 89 (LexisNexis 2006) (authorizing animal control officers to enter
without warrant onto property where animal fighting occurs). Situations falling under this law
include "any place or building in which there is an exhibition of any fighting birds, dogs or other
animals, preparations are being made for such an exhibition, or... animals are owned, possessed,
kept, trained, bred, loaned, sold, exported or otherwise transferred in violation of section 94." Id.;
see also MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 119, § 85 (LexisNexis 2004) (outlining procedure regarding duty
to report animal cruelty, abuse, or neglect); Commonwealth v. Tilton, 49 Mass. 232, 234 (1844)
(expanding scope of statute to include animal fighting).
2 See Commonwealth v. Curry, 23 N.E. 212, 213 (Mass. 1890) (holding harnessing horse
outside without food and shelter as cruelty); Wayne Pacelle, Humane State Ranking 2015: Total
Scores, THE HUMANE SOC'Y OF THE U.S. (Jan. 8, 2016), http://blog.humanesociety.org/wp-
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Trefry, 3 the Appeals Court of Massachusetts addressed the issue of whether
outside confinement, or any type of confinement, is a necessary element to
convict an individual of animal cruelty under Massachusetts law. 4 After
carefully interpreting the legislative intent and performing a textual
analysis of the plain meaning of the statute, the court held that confinement
was not a required element of section 174E; thus, the defendant's act of
leaving her dogs in a condemned house was satisfactory to support a
finding of animal cruelty. 5
In August 2012, Leanne Trefry ("Trefry") moved into a nursing
home because her house was condemned. 6 Her two Shetland sheepdogs,
Zach and Kenji, were purposefully left on the condemned property. 7 The
dogs were left with possible access to the interior of the condemned house
and the connected fenced-in-yard. 8 Numerous items were also left behind
on the property that endangered the dogs' health and safety. 9 Although
Trefry visited the property periodically after the house was condemned, and
received occasional assistance from her friends who did the same, the dogs
were effectually isolated from human interaction. 10
Animal control officers and Trefry's neighbors observed the
deplorable conditions Zach and Kenji were continuously subjected to."
On July 25, 2013, Linda Brogden-Bums, an animal control officer who was

content/uploads/2016/0 i/CORRECTED-Total-Ranking-Scores-2015-FINAL.pdf

(recognizing

Massachusetts as top animal rights state).
' 51 N.E.3d 502, 502 (Mass. App. Ct. 2016).
4 See id. at 507 (determining whether confinement is necessary element to constitute cruel
conditions).

5 See id at 507-08 (finding defendant's home cluttered with trash, feces, and open container
of knives was dangerous).
6 See id at 503-04 (explaining how home owner was removed from home and how house
was condemned).
7 See id at 503 (explaining intentional abandonment of both dogs).
' See Commonwealth v. Trefry, 51 N.E.3d 502, 503 (Mass. App. Ct. 2016) (denoting layout

of condemned house).
9 See id (explaining dogs were around dog feces, trash, open containers, and knives).
10 See id (describing human conduct on premises).
1 See id (detailing house filled with trash , odors of trash inside house, and dog feces
outside house). Furthermore, animal control officer Linda Brogden-Burns noticed that:

[The] house was overgrown on the outside and so cluttered with boxes, books, and
clothing on the inside that it was difficult to walk. A box in the house had both an
open container of old dog food and knives ... the yard was overgrown and that there
were metal parts, old lawn equipment, stools, and stacks of chairs by the back door.
There was stagnant water in bowls. [The officer] was specifically concerned about
items in the yard that posed a danger to the animals, including wires, shovels, and other
items that could fall on or otherwise hurt them.
Id. at 507.
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working with Trefry, observed Kenji limping badly while appearing to be
in pain. 12 The officer intervened and Kenji was subsequently taken to a
veterinarian; three days later both dogs were effectively removed from the
abandoned property.13 Trefry was convicted in the District Court of two
counts of animal cruelty, violating Massachusetts state law. 14 Arguing the
statute was inapplicable because there was no evidence her dogs were
confined to the outdoors, Trefry claimed outside confinement is an element

required for conviction under the statute.15 The District Court, however,
found Trefry's contention without adequate support. 16

12

Appealing the

See id. at 507 (observing that Kenji suffered from Lyme disease with leg and shoulder

injuries).
13 See Trefy, 51 N.E.3d at 507 (finding that dogs' fur was incredibly infested with ticks and
hair matted).
14 See MASS. ANN. LAW ch. 140, § 174E(f) (2016) (protecting dogs from cruel conditions,
inhumane chaining, or tethering); Trefry, 51 N.E.3d at 507 (holding defendant guilty of animal
cruelty under Act).
15 See Trefry, 51 N.E.3d at 507 (arguing confinement outside was necessary element). But
see MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 140, § 174E(f) (2016) (providing definitions of "chain" and "tether").
The statute states:
[N]o person owning or keeping a dog shall subject the dog to cruel conditions or
inhumane chaining or the tethering at any time. For the purposes of this subsection,
"cruel conditions and inhumane chaining or tethering" shall include, but not be limited
to, the following conditions:
(1) filthy and dirty confinement conditions including, but not limited to, exposure
to excessive animal waste, garbage, dirty water, noxious odors, dangerous objects
that could injure or kill a dog upon contact or other circumstances that could
cause harm to a dog's physical or emotional health;
(2) taunting, prodding, hitting, harassing, threatening or otherwise harming a
tethered or confined dog; and
(3) subjecting a dog to dangerous conditions, including attacks by other animals.
Id.
16

See Trefry, 51 N.E.3d at 504 (finding plain meaning of statute does not support

defendant's narrow interpretation); Commonwealth v. Gopaul, 20 N.E.3d 621, 624 (Mass. App.
Ct. 2014) (citations omitted) (indicating in "all matters of statutory interpretation, [courts] look
first to the plain meaning of the statutory language"). See also Arthur D. Little, Inc. v. Comm'r
of Health & Hosps., 481 N.E.2d 441, 446 (Mass. 1985) (stating specific language exclusively
appearing in one section should not be implied elsewhere); Commonwealth v. Millican 867
N.E.2d 725, 728 (Mass. 2007) (declaring no interpretation of statute should determine words
superfluous); Commonwealthv. Erickson, 905 N.E.2d 127, 131-32 (Mass. App. Ct. 2009) (noting
"heightened mental state of 'knowing' and 'willful' conduct was included by Legislature...");
Commonwealthv. Belanger, 565 N.E.2d 811, 812 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991) (explaining statutes that
punish on basis of social concern). The Belanger court explained:
[W]hen statutes impose punishment out of considerations of public policy, lack of
knowledge of the law or of the fact that the law has been violated does not exonerate
the person who may have unwittingly violated the statute.... Transgressions of that
sort of statute have been described as "public welfare" or "strict liability" offenses.
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District Court's finding, Trefry sought review by the Massachusetts
Appeals Court. 17
An Act Further Regulating Municipal Animal Control has been in

effect since October 31, 2012 in Massachusetts. 18 Statutes focusing on the
prevention of "intentional and neglectful animal cruelty" have been
created. 19 Under the statute, acts including torture, overworking, and
mutilation constitute animal cruelty.20 Certain animal cruelty statutes are
more expansive, making it a crime for the owner of an animal to
"unnecessarily fail to provide it with proper food, drink, shelter, sanitary
environment, or protection from weather.",21 The 2012 Act was an
expansive measure to protect all animals, but, specifically, it protects
dogs. 2 2 In addition, the Act defined the duration and conditions to
appropriately restrain a dog outside
and provided provisions which updated
23
crucial animal protection laws.
565 N.E.2d at 812 (citations omitted).
1 See Trefry, 51 N.E.3d at 504 (discussing alleged error in District Court's analysis).

8 See An Act Further Regulating Municipal Animal Control, 2012 MASS. ACTS ch. 193, §
48 (S.B. 2192) (codified at MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 140, § 174E (2012)); Trefry, 51 N.E.3d at 506
(stating Act was recently enacted).
19 See Commonwealth v. Duncan, 7 N.E.3d 469, 473-74 (Mass. 2014) (focusing on

preventing cruelty to animals); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 272, § 77 (LexisNexis 2014) (outlining
conduct constituting animal cruelty); see also MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 140, § 152 (LexisNexis
2012) (outlining duties of animal control officers regarding individuals violating animal cruelty
laws); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 272, § 89 (LexisNexis 2006) (governing animal control officers'
authorization to enter without warrant); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 119, § 85 (LexisNexis 2004)
(outlining animal cruelty reporting procedure).
20 See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 272, § 77 (LexisNexis 2014) (outlining acts to
evince animal
cruelty); Duncan, 7 N.E.3d at 474-75 (reiterating different acts classifiable as animal cruelty).
21 MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 272, § 77 (LexisNexis through 2017 Legis. Sess.)
(outlining
multiple acts able to prove cruelty to animals); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 272, § 82 (LexisNexis

through 2017 Legs. Sess.) (discussing procedures for arresting individuals for animal cruelty);
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 129, § 9 (LexisNexis 1987) (defining duties and powers of Massachusetts
animal organization agents). The statute states agents may:
[V]isit all places at which neat cattle, horses, mules, sheep, swine or other animals are
delivered for transportation or are slaughtered, any pet shop where animals, birds, fish
or reptiles are sold, or exhibited, or for sale, any guard dog business, any hearing dog
business and any stable where horses are kept for hire or boarded for a fee, or any
licensed kennel where animals are boarded for a fee or any animal dealer licensed with
the United States Department of Agriculture, for the purpose of preventing violations
of any law and of detecting and punishing the same and such agents shall have the

power to prosecute any such violation coming to their notice.
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 119, § 85 2004) (outlining (reporting procedure for
animal cruelty, abuse, and neglect).

ch. 129, § 9;
22

See Laura Hagen, Legislative Review: 2012 State Legislative Review, 19 ANIMAL L. 497,

532 (2013) (stating Act created critical changes in outdated animal laws including statewide spray
and neuter program).
23 See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 140, § 174E(a) (2012) (requiring dogs confined outside to be
provided with clean water and appropriate shelter). Subsection (a) of the statute asserts:
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Further, the 2012 Act expanded animal control laws by making
critical changes in outdated regulations to prohibit animal cruelty.24 The
legislation's goal was furthered by its inclusion of animal control officer
training. 2' The animal-control training provisions, in particular, provide a
foundation for the 2012 Act. 26 The Act includes the requirement that
animal control officers receive formal training since they are the first
respondents to situations involving animal cruelty. 27 The animal protection
law is more effectively enforced if better animal control officer training is
provided.28

(a) No person owning or keeping a dog shall chain or tether a dog for longer than 5
hours in a 24 hour period or outside from 10:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m., unless the tethering
is for not more than 15 minutes and the dog is not left unattended by the owner,
guardian or keeper. A tethering employed shall not allow the dog to leave the owner's,
guardian's or keeper's property. The tether shall be designed for dogs and no logging
chains or other lines or devices not designed for tethering dogs shall be used. No chain
or tether shall weigh more than / of the dog's body weight. Nothing in this section
shall be construed to prohibit a person from walking a dog on a hand-held leash. No
dog under the age of 6 months shall be tethered outside for any length of time.
Id. Further, the act provides examples of appropriate confinement and conditions
necessary for where a dog may live. Id. at § 174E(b).
24 See Hagen, supra note 22, at 531-32 (adding measures to modernize animal control laws
to
help further prevent animal cruelty). Hagen declares the following:
[A]fter many years of hard work, An Act Relative to Animal Control finally passed in
2012 with critical changes essential to strengthening outdated animal control laws ....
The legislation aims to protect animals and prevent acts of animal cruelty through
improved animal control officer training, stricter euthanasia regulations, breedneutrality in regards to 'dangerous dogs' and standardized holding time for stray
animals, which will save municipalities money and allow for these animals to find new
and loving homes more quickly[.]
Id. at 532 (quoting Senator Patricia Jehlen).
25 See id. (explaining that updating animal control training was necessary element increasing
success of statute).
26 See id. at 532-33 (denoting a focused emphasis on updated animal control).
27 See 2012 MASS. ACTS ch. 193, §§ 21, 51 (codified as MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 140, § 15IC
(2012) (characterizing training of animal control officers as top legislative priority).
28 See Hagen, supra note 22, at 533 (stating lack of training becomes real problem). Hagen
stresses:
[A]COs [animal control officers] are first-responders to situations involving domestic
animals, wildlife and, sometimes, exotic animals. ACOs address dangerous dogs,
animal cruelty, and other threats to public health and safety. As such, it is critical that
they understand and enforce state laws protecting people and animals.
The
problem ... is that animal-protection laws
despite their strength
can be
ineffectual without on-the-ground enforcement.

2017]

MUST LOVE DOGS

Additionally, the Act helps to regulate human interaction with
animals by prohibiting certain means of putting animals to death and
animal use in scientific experiments. 29 Moreover, as part of the Act, the
legislature allows judges to consider the welfare of household pets when
issuing protective orders.30 Thus, judges are granted the authority to "make
a finding based on the totality of the circumstances" in their determination
of whether a threat existed against a pet.31 The continuous broadening of
laws, such as the law implemented in 2012, reflect the constant push for
inclusion of human treatment of animals in public policy and serves as the
legal foundation for addressing animal cruelty cases. 32
In Trefry, the Massachusetts Appeals Court affirmed the lower
court's finding that Trefry violated Mass. Gen. Laws. ch. 140 §174E(f).33
The court concluded that subjecting a dog to cruel conditions is enough to

convict under the statute.3 4 Moreover, the court rejected the defendant's
argument that "outside confinement or confinement in general is an
element" needed to convict under the statute.35 The court held that reading

the statute to indicate confinement as a necessary element to convict, would
ignore subsection (f).36
29

See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 140, § 174E (LexisNexis 2016) (permitting euthanasia only by

barbiturates in manner deemed acceptable).
'o See Commonwealth v. Duncan, 7 N.E.3d 471, 474-75 (Mass. 2014) (allowing judicial
discretion when developing develop individual threshold for establishing animal cruelty cases).
31 Id. at 474. See MASS. ANN. LAWS. ch. 209A, § 11 (LexisNexis 2012) (delineating criteria
for finding imminent threat or bodily injury to domesticated animal).
32 See Commonwealth v. Yee, 281 N.E.2d 248, 252 (Mass. 1972) (stating public policy is
basic source of law when no previous authority is applicable).
"3 See Commonwealth v. Trefry, 51 N.E.3d 502, 507-08 (Mass. App. Ct. 2016) (affirming
district court's decision).
14 See id. at 507 (explaining appropriate inferences drawn from applicable evidence).
"The
evidence was more than sufficient to establish that the dogs were subjected to 'dangerous
conditions' in violation of § 174E(/)(3)." Id.
15 See id. at 503 (rejecting defendant's argument). The court goes
onto explain:
[T] he plain meaning of the statute does not support the defendant's narrow reading that
outside confinement or, indeed, confinement in general, is an element of the subjecting
of dogs to cruel conditions that is prohibited by this subsection. "[F]ilthy and dirty
confinement" under § 174E(f)(1) is but one example of the kind of cruel conditions
that are prohibited.
Id. at 504 (citations omitted).
36 See id. at 504-05 (emphasizing intent behind statute's enactment is to protect dogs). The
court explains the statute's intent by detailing:
[T]he switch from the disjunctive to a combination of the conjunctive and the
disjunctive in the preamble to the nonexhaustive list does not alter [the] analysis, as it
merely reflects § 174E's consistent equation of "chaining" and "tethering." In effect,
then, the Legislature is simply providing examples of situations that are violative of the
statute as either cruel conditions or inhumane tethering or chaining, a list that includes
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Consequently, the court examined Mass. Gen. Law. ch. 140,
§174E, as a whole, to identify any ambiguity within the confinement
prohibitions .3 The court suggested that the animal cruelty statute's scope
is not limited.38 Therefore, the statute not only regulates the conditions to
which an animal can be confined, but its overlapping statutory coverage
subjects dog owners to a variety of possible violations.3 9 Furthermore,

dogs do not have to be confined for the statute's protection to be
implicated. 40 Thus, the evidence provided at trial was enough to establish
that Trefry's two dogs were subjected to dangerous conditions in violation
of section 174E(f) because the statute generally does not require

confinement. 4 '
examples where dogs are confined (§ 174E[][1] and [2]), and examples where they are
not (§174E[/][3]).
Id. at 504 (citations omitted); see generally MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 140, § 174E(a) (LexisNexis

2016) (referring to "chain or tether"); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 140, § 174E(f) (referring to
"tethered or confined").
17 See Trefry, 51 N.E.3d at 504-05 ("[R]eading § 174E as a whole
suggests that subsection Ct)
is indeed different from the preceding subsections and that subsection (e), which sets out an
exception 'to the above restrictions on outdoor confinement,' is the dividing line between
subsections devoted to outdoor confinement and one addressed more generally to the conditions
in which dogs are kept.").
38 See id at 505 (discussing statutory limitation of dog confinement that is unsupported by
broad statute).
'9See id ("We are also unpersuaded by the defendant's argument that taking the words of
the statute at their plain meaning brings G.L. c. 140, § 174E0/), into conflict with the overlapping
coverage of the animal cruelty statute ... inflicting unnecessary cruelty on the animal,
unnecessarily failing to provide the animal with a proper sanitary environment, willfully [sic]
abandoning the animal, or knowingly and willfully [sic] authorizing or permitting the animal to
be subjected to unnecessary suffering or cruelty of any kind."). Furthernrore, the court discusses
the necessary intent required for a violation of the statute: "no mental state is explicitly required
under subsection (/)." Id.at 506; see also Commonwealth v. Erickson, 905 N.E.2d 127, 131-32
(Mass. App. Ct. 2009) (noting "heightened mental state of 'knowing' and 'willful' conduct was
included by the Legislature"); Commonwealth v. Belanger, 565 N.E.2d 811, 812 (Mass. App. Ct.
1991) ("When statutes impose punishment out of considerations of public policy, lack of
knowledge of the law or of the fact that the law has been violated does not exonerate the person
who may have unwittingly violated the statute .... Transgressions of that sort of statute have
been described as 'public welfare' or 'strict liability' offenses.") (citations omitted).
4 See Trefry, 51 N.E.3d at 505 (arguing requirement illogical where dogs' safety is
imperiled, even if space is not confining).
41 See id. at 505-07 (explaining if confinement was element of statute, Trefry is still violating
statute) The court states:
[W]ile the dogs could move in and out of the condemned house by means of a broken
latch on the back door, the dogs were in fact confined to the defendant's house and
fenced-in yard. There was overwhelming evidence that the area to which the dogs
were confined ... constitute[ed] "filthy and dirty" conditions. Retired Brewster police
Sergeant Steven Freiner testified that, as of April, 2013, there was a large amount of
debris and trash inside and outside the house as well as a foul smell of trash coming
from inside the house. Allen Borgal, a lieutenant with the Animal Rescue League of
Boston and director of the Center for Animal Protection, reported that the yard was
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When analyzing the facts in Trefry, the court adhered to the

necessary steps when discussing the statutory interpretation of the word
"confinement" under section 174E of the statute.42 The court used the rule
in Commonwealth v. Gopaul43 to discuss the significance of the words used
under section 174E. 44 The court first addressed the use of the words "filthy
and dirty confinement" under section 174E(f)(1), stating that it is "one
example of the kind of cruel conditions that is prohibited under the

statute.,

45

Furthermore, subsection (f)(3)'s prohibition against subjecting

dogs to dangerous conditions is made, in contrast to subsection (f)(1) and
(f)(2), without any reference to confinement or tethering.4 6
The
legislature's continued switch from using the term "chaining" or
"tethering" in one section, and not in another, is an example of the
legislature demonstrating how an individual can violate the statute. 47 Thus,
reading the statute as a whole supports the court's conclusion that the

defendant violated the statute .48

overgrown, that no dog feces had been picked up, and that the yard consequently
smelled like dog feces when he visited the property in July, 2013.
Id. at 507-08.
42 See MASS. ANN. LAWS. ch. 140, § 174E (LexisNexis 2016) (discussing chaining and
tethering when confining animals under statute); Trefry, 51 N.E.3d at 504-07 (stating court's
analysis in finding that defendant was in violation of law).
4' 20 N.E.3d 621, 623 (Mass. App. Ct. 2014) (indicating that in matters of statutory
interpretation, courts look at plain meaning of statutory language). "[W]here the language of the
statute is plain and unambiguous, it is conclusive as to legislative intent." Id. (quoting Thurdin v.
SEI Boston, LLC, 895 N.E.2d 446, 452 (Mass. 2008)).
44 See MASS. ANN. LAWS. ch. 140, §174E(f) (LexisNexis 2016) (stating mode of restraint).
45 Trefry, 51 N.E.3d at 507-08 (interpreting the words "filthy" and "dirty" in context of
confinement).
46 See id. (arguing that subjecting dog to cruel conditions is sufficient to establish liability).
The court states that if cruel conditions are not enough to establish liability in the absence of
some act of chaining or tethering, "then such an interpretation would render impermissibly
superfluous the inclusion of 'confinement' in § 174E(f)(1) and 'tethered or confined' in § 174E
(f)(2). Id. at 504. See also Arthur D. Little, Inc. v. Comm'r of Health & Hosp., 481 N.E.2d 441,
446 (Mass. 1985) ("'[W]here the Legislature has employed specific language in one [portion of a
statute], but not in another, the language should not be implied where it is not present."') (quoting
Sch. Comm. of Brockton v. Teachers' Ret. Bd., 471 N.E.2d 61, 65-66 (Mass. 1984));
Commonwealth v. Millican, 867 N.E.2d 725, 728 (Mass. 2007) (declaring no words in statute
should be viewed as superfluous).
47 See Trefry, 51 N.E.3d at 504 (arguing legislature provides examples of violative acts as
cruel conditions or inhumane chaining or tethering). For example, under subsection (f)(1) and
(f)(2) the legislature provides examples of where dogs are confined, while subsection (f)(3) does
not. Id.; see also MASS. ANN. LAWS. ch. 140, § 174E(f) (LexisNexis 2016) (same).
48 See Trefry, 51 N.E.3d at 504-05 (assessing elements of statute). The court explains how
section 174E should be interpreted:
[I]n fact, reading § 174E as a whole suggests that subsection ) is indeed different
from the preceding subsections and that subsection (e), which sets out an exception "to
the above restrictions on outdoor confinement," is the dividing line between
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Furthermore, under the analysis set forth in Commonwealth v.
Duncan,49 the defendant's contention - that a violation only occurs when
dogs are kept exclusively outside - fails. 50 First, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 140,
§ 174E is a new statute, and Duncan is one of the only cases that discusses
the policy behind its enactment, protecting dogs specifically. 5' The court
in Duncan discusses not only the role of protecting dogs that are kept
outside, but also emphasizes the broader policy of preventing cruelty to
animals. 5 2 Additionally, the court addressed the exposure dogs have to
conditions that can "injure or kill [them]" 53 when a yard is ill-equipped similar to Zack and Kenji's exposure to the defendant's yard.5 4 The court
is correct in its analysis that dogs do not have to be confined exclusively to
the yard to trigger protection under the statute."
Moreover, the court in Trefry discussed the conflict between the
plain meaning of the statute and the overlapping coverage of the animal

subsections devoted to outdoor confinement and one addressed more generally to the
conditions in which dogs are kept.
Id.
49 7 N.E.3d 469 (Mass. 2014).
50 See id.
at 473-74 (promoting public policy to
51 See id.
(highlighting need to protect dogs).

help animals).
The court observed that in enacting MASS.
GEN. LAWS ch. 140, § 174E, "the Legislature took steps to protect dogs in particular, by
prescribing the duration and conditions under which they may be restrained outside" and noted
that the statute requires, among other necessities, "that dogs confined outside be provided with
clean water and appropriate shelter." Id.
52 See id.
at 474 (listing numerous instances where policies regulating human interaction with
animals will be upheld). The Duncan court explains, "[a] web of other statutes also regulates
human interaction with animals, for example, by prohibiting certain means of putting animals to
death; imposing restrictions on railroad corporations that transport animals; and restricting the use
of animals in scientific experimentation." Id.(citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, §§ 80E, 80G,
81). The Duncan court also focuses on the 2012 Act by stipulating that the "Legislature
authorize[s] judges to consider the welfare of household pets when issuing protective orders;
judges 'may make a finding, based upon the totality of the circumstances, as to whether there
exists an imminent threat of bodily injury to' a pet .... Duncan, 7 N.E.3d at 474 (quoting
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch.209A, § 11 (2012)).
" Duncan, 7 N.E.3d at 474 (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 140, § 174E(f)(1) (2012)).
14 See Commonwealth v. Trefry, 51 N.E.3d 502, 507 (Mass. App. Ct. 2016)
(holding

defendant's home cluttered with trash, feces, and open container of knives posed risk).
55 See id.
at 505-06 (arguing confinement exclusively to a yard would ignore the policy and
purpose behind the statute). The court argues that the Duncan court:
[D]id not state that the dogs had to be confined to those yards in order to trigger the
statute's protection, nor would it be sensible to impose such a requirement where the

safety of dogs is imperiled even by an ill-equipped yard to which they have access but
in which they are not confined. The defendant's conviction here is fully consistent
with the court's citation to subsection (/) and the dangers faced by dogs in "illequipped yards."
Id.at 505. See also Duncan, 7 N.E.3d at 474 (discussing the broader context of § 174E).
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cruelty statute.56 The court argued that the plain language of Mass. Gen.
Laws ch. 140, § 174E is not limited to specific conditions; therefore, there
is no disharmony or inconsistency that automatically arises from the
overlapping coverage of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 272, § 77.57 The statutes
work together to protect dogs 58from the intentional and neglectful conduct
of their owners or custodians.
Thus, the court continuously invokes the
policy and purpose of the statute's enactment and correctly concludes that
the defendant was in violation of the law.59
In Trefry, the court analyzed discussed the issue of whether
confinement is a necessary element in violation of section 174E(f) of the
Act. The court concluded correctly that it is not a necessary element of the
Act, but rather, an example of how one can be in violation of animal
56

See Trefry, 51 N.E.3d at 506 (finding no disharmony or inconsistency regarding plain

meaning of statute coverage provided under statute). The court clarifies this contention by
holding that there is "no disharmony or inconsistency [that] automatically arises from overlapping
statutory coverage, especially where one statute establishes a felony and another establishes a
misdemeanor." Id.
" See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 140, §174E (LexisNexis 2016) (stating no express requirement
for dogs to be chained or tethered outside). Rather, the statute provides a list of examples of how
animals can be chained or tethered outside. See MASS. ANN. LAWS 140, § 174E (b). See also
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 272, § 77 (LexisNexis 2014) (prohibiting those who have charge or
custody of animal from inflicting unnecessary cruelty on animal). Section 77 of chapter 272
provides examples of cruelty towards animals: unnecessarily failing to provide animals with a
proper sanitary environment, willfully abandoning animals, or knowingly and willfully
authorizing or permitting animals to be subjected to unnecessary suffering or cruelty of any kind.
Id.; see also Trefry, 51 N.E.3d at 505-06 ("[E]ven defendant's reading of statute were accepted it
would not eliminate her claimed overlap with the animal cruelty statute, as overlap would remain
with respect to those cases where a confined or tethered dog is subjected to conditions that would
violate both G.L. c. 140, § 174E(f), and G.L. c. 272, § 77").
58 See Duncan, 51 N.E.3d at 473 ("Our statutes evince a focus on the prevention of both
intentional and neglectful animal cruelty."); Commonwealth v. Erickson, 905 N.E.2d 127, 131
(Mass. 2004) (discussing mental state included in portions of statute). See also Hagen, supra note
22, at 532 (discussing purpose of amending animal control statutes). As Senator Patricia Jehlen,
stated:
[A]fter many years of hard work, An Act Relative to Animal Control finally passed in
2012 with critical changes essential to strengthening outdated animal control laws ....
The legislation aims to protect animals and prevent acts of animal cruelty through
improved animal control officer training, stricter euthanasia regulations, breedneutrality in regards to 'dangerous dogs' and standardized holding time for stray
animals, which will save municipalities money and allow for these animals to find new
and loving homes more quickly[.]
Hagen, supra note 22, at 532 (citing e-mail from Sara Doherty, Commc'n Dir., Off. of Sen.
Patricia Jehlen, to Laura Hagen, Author, ANiAL L. (Feb. 5, 2013) (on file with ANIAL L.)).
'9 See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 140, § 174E (LexisNexis 2016) (stating examples, but
providing no requirement, of how dogs can be chained or tethered outside); MASS. ANN. LAWS
ch. 272, § 77 (LexisNexis 2014) (prohibiting those who have charge or custody of animal from
inflicting unnecessary cruelty on animal); see also sources cited supra note 57 and accompanying
text (explaining prohibition of inflicting unnecessary cruelty or suffering on animals).
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cruelty. Defendant Trefry was in violation of the law because she
purposefully left her dogs on a condemned property. The animal control
officer was only fulfilling her duty as an agent in protecting animals from
inhumane conditions. The dogs were left in an environment in which they
were susceptible to many dangers, which resulted in one contracting Lyme
disease. Although this was an issue of first impression, the court followed
the necessary steps in analyzing the statutory language, and taking into
consideration the purpose of the statute. Consequently, the court was
correct in its conclusion to affirm the lower court's decision to convict the
defendant for her cruel treatment of her dogs.
Keshia L. Blair

